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We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment
level and capital structure, trading off the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly
default. Bankruptcy costs are endogenous, as bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their
assets, resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid. When the corporate income tax
rate is positive, firms have a unique optimal capital structure. In equilibrium, firms default
with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire-sale prices. The equilibrium
features underinvestment and is constrained inefficient. In particular there is too little debt
and default. (JEL D5, D6, G32, G33)
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe
have focused attention on the macroeconomic consequences of debt financing.
In this paper, we turn our attention to the use of debt financing in the corporate
sector and study the general equilibrium effects of debt financing on investment
and growth. We show that, when markets are incomplete and firms use debt
and equity to finance investment, there is underinvestment and debt financing
is too low in equilibrium.
At the heart of our analysis is the determination of the firm’s capital structure.
In the classical model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure is
indeterminate. To obtain a determinate capital structure, subsequent authors
appealed to market frictions, such as distortionary taxes, bankruptcy costs, and
agency costs.1 We follow this tradition and examine an environment in which
the optimal capital structure balances the tax advantages of debt against the
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risk of bankruptcy. More precisely, debt has an advantage over equity because
interest payments are deductible from corporate income, whereas dividends
and retained earnings are not. At the same time, the use of debt generates the
risk of bankruptcy, which the firm perceives as costly because it forces the
firm to sell its assets at fire-sale prices. In choosing its capital structure,
the firm balances the costs and benefits of debt and equity. We show that these
costs and benefits support an interior optimum of the firm’s capital structure
decision.
We consider an infinite-horizon economy, in which firms choose their
production and investment in long-lived capital goods and are subject to
productivity shocks. We primarily focus on firms’ decisions and abstract
from distributional issues by assuming there is a representative consumer.
Firms finance the purchase of capital by issuing debt and equity. We assume
that markets are incomplete in two respects. First, there are no markets for
contingent claims allowing firms to insure against the risk of bankruptcy.
Second, when a firm is bankrupt, that is, fails to pay its debtors or to renegotiate
its debt, the liquidation of its assets is subject to a finance constraint that
causes assets to be sold at fire sale prices, i.e., at less than their fundamental
value.
In our model, both the corporate income tax and the cost of bankruptcy
represent a pure redistribution of resources rather than a real resource cost for
the economy. The corporate income tax revenue is returned to consumers in
the form of lump-sum transfers. Similarly, the fire sale of assets constitutes
a transfer of value, rather than a deadweight cost, to the shareholders of the
firms that buy the assets of bankrupt firms. Because there is a representative
consumer, this “redistribution” has no effect on welfare. Nonetheless, a rational,
value-maximizing manager of a competitive firm will perceive the tax as a cost
of using equity finance and the risk of a fire sale in bankruptcy as a cost of using
debt. These private costs determine the firm’s financing decisions, act like a tax
on capital, and distort the firm’s investment decision.
As a baseline, consider the case in which the corporate income tax rate is zero.
In the baseline case, the competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient
and the firms’ capital structure is indeterminate.2 In other words, with a zero
corporate income tax rate, the finance constraint never binds and bankruptcy
does not result in fire sales. By contrast, when the corporate income tax rate
is positive, competitive equilibria have quite different properties. They are not
just Pareto inefficient, exhibiting underinvestment, but they are also constrained
inefficient.Also, the optimal capital structure of firms is uniquely determined in
equilibrium, each firm uses positive amounts of risky debt and equity as sources
of finance and faces a positive probability of bankruptcy and fire sales. So many
2 To be precise, for each individual firm any combination of debt and equity is optimal. There is however a
constraint on the aggregate amount of debt in the economy, that has to be small enough that fire sales do not
occur.
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features of the equilibrium change when the corporate tax rate becomes positive
because the tax interacts with the incompleteness of markets and the finance
constraint to endogenously generate private costs of bankruptcy.
The intuition for the second property is simple. If the probability of
bankruptcy were zero or if bankrupt firms could be liquidated with no loss of
value, then all firms would use 100% debt financing to avoid the corporate
income tax. But, in equilibrium, we will show that 100% debt financing
is inconsistent with a zero probability of bankruptcy or the absence of fire
sales, and is not an optimal decision for firms. A similar argument shows
that some debt has to be used in equilibrium. If firms used 100% equity
finance, there would be no bankruptcy. Then a single firm could issue a small
amount of debt and benefit from the tax hedge, without causing a fire sale.
Uniqueness of the optimal capital structure follows from the fact that a rational
manager equates the perceived marginal costs of debt and equity financing in
equilibrium, and we show that, under reasonable conditions, the marginal costs
are increasing.3
The constrained inefficiency of the equilibrium is the result of a pecuniary
externality. The tax on equity reduces the return on capital and causes
underinvestment in equilibrium. In equilibrium, each firm sets its capital
structure so that the benefit of a marginal increase in its debt level, in
terms of lower tax paid by the firm, just offsets the increase in private
bankruptcy costs.4 However, if all firms were to increase their use of debt,
the liquidation price of defaulting firms would drop, and hence the profits of
any firm buying these assets when solvent increase. This effect offsets the
increase in private costs when the firm is bankrupt. As a result, an increase
in the debt level of all firms would lower the tax paid and increase the
return on capital and hence also investment and welfare. Each firm is a
price taker and hence overestimates the costs of debt financing, whereas the
planner takes into account the change in prices when all firms increase the
use of debt. This is the source of the pecuniary externality. Note that this
externality arises even in the presence of a representative consumer. Consumers
collectively own all the assets; tax revenues are returned to consumers;
and firms hold the same assets after liquidation. Nonetheless, we find that
individual firms’ decisions are distorted and this imposes a welfare cost on the
economy.
As a result of this externality, in the environment considered, there is too
little bankruptcy risk and too little debt financing in equilibrium. This appears
3 We do not wish to claim too much for this result, of course. The optimal capital structure is unique only within a
given (symmetric) equilibrium. In general, the capital structure depends on the equilibrium, which in turn depends
on the model parameters, including policy parameters, such as the tax rate. But note that the Modigliani-Miller
theorem also holds for a given equilibrium of a given model.
4 The cost of increasing the firm’s debt level has two components. First, the probability of going bankrupt and
having to liquidate assets in a fire sale increases. Second, the probability of making capital gains when solvent
by buying assets of other firms in a fire sale is reduced.
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to contradict the common intuition that firms have an incentive to use too much
debt. Our analysis shows the importance of a careful evaluation of the costs of
firms’ default and of the reallocation of assets among them which takes place
in this event, illustrating a novel effect of fire sales. The actual costs of default–
and hence of debt relative to equity financing–may prove to be lower than the
costs perceived by firms, as firms also benefit from this reallocation and the
opportunity to acquire assets at low prices, and these prices are lower when
the probability of default is higher. This misperception induces firms to rely
too little on debt compared with other sources of funding for which the risk
of default is lower. We believe this effect is particularly relevant in markets in
which the firms purchasing assets at fire-sale prices are the same firms running
the risk of default.
1. Related Literature
The classical literature on the firm’s investment decision excludes external
finance constraints and bankruptcy costs and uses adjustment costs to explain
the reliance of investment on Tobin’s q (see Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent
2008 for a contemporary example). The new wave literature on investment,
exemplified by Sundaresan, Wang, and Yang (2014) and Bolton, Chen, and
Wang (2013), incorporates financing frictions of various types, such as a cost of
external funds, liquidity constraints, and costs of liquidating the firm’s assets.
Hackbarth and Mauer (1979) then also allow for multiple debt issues with
possibly different seniority. These papers study the investment and financing
decisions of an individual firm in partial equilibrium.
A few papers, like our work, consider dynamic general equilibrium models
with several heterogeneous firms making optimal investment and financing
decisions. Gomes and Schmid (2010) and Miao and Wang (2010) study an
environment fairly close to ours: they also examine a representative agent
economy in which firms’investment can be financed with debt or equity, subject
to a similar structure of costs. The liquidation cost, in the event of default, is
exogenous in their setup, whereas it is endogenously determined in ours by
the equilibrium price of liquidated assets. Also, they focus on the numerical
analysis of an equilibrium for a specification of the model aimed to match the
persistence and volatility of output growth, as well as credit spreads, whereas we
provide a qualitative characterization of equilibria and their welfare properties.
The links between firms’credit risk and their leverage and investment decisions
across the business cycle are examined by Kuehn and Schmid (2014) in a partial
equilibrium model with similar costs of financing.
The macroeconomic literature has emphasized the role of external finance
constraints in the business cycle. The financial accelerator model (Bernanke and
Gertler 1989; Bernanke, Gilchrist, and Gertler 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997)
shows that shocks to firm equity or the value of collateral can restrict borrowing
and amplify business-cycle fluctuations. Our focus is rather different: we
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consider an environment in which financial frictions take the form of private
costs of debt or equity financing rather than borrowing constraints. We also
emphasize the factors that determine the firm’s choice of capital structure and
the implications of these factors for welfare and regulatory interventions.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) have shown that capital reallocation is
procyclical, whereas default is countercyclical. This might suggest that
reallocation of capital associated with fire sales might be a relatively small
part of capital reallocation as a whole. Because Eisfeldt and Rampini’s (2006)
data is not broken down by the amount of reallocation that results from fire
sales, we are un of the size of that component. This is a question that requires
further research.5
Pecuniary externalities play a key role in our welfare analysis. It has
been well known since the mid-1980s that pecuniary externalities have an
impact on welfare in the presence of market incompleteness, information
asymmetries, or other frictions (Arnott and Stiglitz 1986; Greenwald and
Stiglitz 1986; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1986). It is interesting to
contrast our constrained inefficiency result to the ones obtained by Lorenzoni
(2008) (see also Bianchi 2011; Korinek 2012; Gersbach and Rochet 2012) in
a financial accelerator model of the kind discussed in the previous paragraph,
in which firms’ borrowing is constrained by the future value of their assets.
These authors show that equilibria may display excessive borrowing, because
a reduction in borrowing and investment allows the reduction of misallocation
costs of selling some of the firms’ assets in order to absorb negative shocks.
In contrast, we show the inefficiency of the firms’ capital structure decisions
in equilibrium in an environment in which firms are not constrained by the
level of their collateral, but face some (endogenous) costs of using alternative
sources of funding. We find that an increase in the use of debt relative to equity
allows firms to lower their cost of funds, because the liquidation of the assets
of bankrupt firms at fire-sale prices constitutes not only a cost for a firm when
bankrupt but also a benefit for the same firm when solvent, a concept which
firms fail to properly internalize.
The interaction between illiquidity and incompleteness of asset markets is
also studied in the literature on banking and financial crises. For models of fire
sales and their impact on bank portfolios, see Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b).
Wagner (2011) studies the impact of fire sales on agents’ portfolio choices: the
possibility of forced liquidation by leveraged investors leads them to choose
heterogeneous portfolios, thus sacrificing some of the benefits of diversification.
The debt renegotiation process in our model was previously used by Gale
and Gottardi (2011) in a static model in which, by assumption, all investment
was 100% debt financed.
5 The data that Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) use to measure capital reallocation is deflated using the CPI. Since the
price of capital may vary over the cycle and would be expected to be lower in distress sales than in non-distressed
sales, the figures are likely to understate capital reallocation resulting from fire sales.
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2. The Economy
We consider an infinite-horizon production economy. Time is described by a
countable sequence of dates, t =0,1,.... At each date there are two goods, a
perishable consumption good and a durable capital good.
2.1 Consumers
There is a unit mass of identical, infinitely lived consumers. The consumption
stream of the representative consumer is denoted by c =(c0,c1,...)≥0, where
ct is the amount of the consumption good consumed at date t . For any c≥0,
the representative consumer’s utility is denoted by U (c) and given by
U (c)=
∞∑
t=0
δtu(ct ), (1)
where 0<δ<1 and u :R+ →R has the usual properties: it is C2 and such that
u′ (c)>0 and u′′ (c)<0 for any c≥0.
2.2 Production
There are two production sectors in the economy. In one, capital is produced
using the consumption good as an input. In the other, the consumption good is
produced using the capital good as an input.
2.2.1 Capital goods sector. There is a unit mass of firms operating the
technology for producing capital. If It ≥0 is the amount of the consumption
good used as an input at date t , the output is ϕ (It )≥0 units of capital at
the end of the period, where ϕ (·) is a C2 function satisfying ϕ′ (It )>0 and
ϕ′′ (It )<0, for any It ≥0, as well as the Inada conditions, limI→0ϕ′ (I )=∞ and
limI→∞ϕ′ (I )=0.
2.2.2 Consumption goods sector. The technology for producing the
consumption good uses capital as an input and exhibits constant returns to
scale. Production in this sector is undertaken by a continuum of firms subject
to independent stochastic depreciation rates. Each unit of capital good used
as an input by firm i at an arbitrary date t produces (instantaneously) A>0
units of output and becomes θit units after production takes place. The random
variables θit are assumed to be i.i.d. across firms, as well as over time, with
mean θ¯ , support ∈ [0,1], and a continuous p.d.f. f (θ ). We denote the c.d.f. by
F (θ ) and the only other condition we impose on the distribution of θ is that the
hazard rate f (z)1−F (z) is increasing.
2.3 Feasible allocations
At date 0, there is an initial stock of capital goods k¯0 >0. To characterize the
allocations attainable in this economy, the heterogeneity among firms and the
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idiosyncratic depreciation shocks can be ignored, because production can be
diversified across the large number of firms. By the law of large numbers
convention, there is no aggregate uncertainty and the aggregate depreciation
rate is constant, with a fraction θ¯ of the capital stock remaining each period
after depreciation. Thus, a total amount of kt ≥0 units of capital goods at date
t produces Akt units of consumption and leaves, after depreciation, θ¯kt units
of capital goods to be used next period.
A (symmetric) allocation is thus given by a sequence {ct ,kt ,It }∞t=0 that
specifies the consumption ct , capital kt , and investment It at each date t .
The allocation {ct ,kt ,It }∞t=0 is feasible if, for every date t =0,1,..., it satisfies
nonnegativity,
(ct ,kt ,It )≥0, (2)
attainability for the consumption good,
ct +It ≤Akt , (3)
and the law of motion for capital,
kt+1 = θ¯kt +ϕ (It ), (4)
together with the initial condition k0 = k¯0.
It follows from the assumptions regarding the technology for producing the
capital good that there exists a unique level of the capital stock, 0<kˆ<∞,
satisfying the condition
ϕ
(
Akˆ
)
=
(
1− θ¯)kˆ.
When the capital stock at the beginning of a period is equal to kˆ, if all the
current output of the consumption good is used for investment, the amount of
capital available at the end of the period remains constant, equal to kˆ. It is then
straightforward to show that kˆ constitutes an upper bound on the permanently
feasible levels of the stock of capital.
Proposition 1. At any feasible allocation {ct ,kt ,It }∞t=0, we have
limsupt→∞kt ≤ kˆ.
As a corollary, Akˆ is an upper bound on the levels of consumption and
investment that can be maintained indefinitely:
lim sup
t→∞
ct ≤Akˆ, lim sup
t→∞
It ≤Akˆ.
2.4 Efficient allocations
A first-best, socially optimal allocation maximizes the utility of the
representative consumer within the set of feasible allocations. More precisely,
it is a sequence {ct ,kt ,It }∞t=0 that solves the problem of maximizing the
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representative consumer’s utility (1) subject to the feasibility constraints (2),
(3), and (4).
To characterize the properties of the first-best, consider the necessary and
sufficient conditions for an interior solution
(
cFBt ,k
FB
t ,I
FB
t
)0, t =0,1,... of
this problem. For some nonnegative multipliers {(λt ,μt )}∞t=0, the allocation{(
cFBt ,k
FB
t ,I
FB
t
)}∞
t=0 must satisfy the conditions
δtu′
(
cFBt
)
=λt ,
λt+1A+μt+1θ¯ =μt,
and
μtϕ
′(IFBt )=λt ,
for every t , together with the feasibility conditions (2)-(4) and the initial
condition k0 = k¯0. The boundedness property established above implies that
the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
∞∑
s=t
δsu(cs)=0
is automatically satisfied.
Much of our analysis focuses on steady states, that is, on allocations such
that
(ct ,kt ,It )= (c,k,I )
for all t . It is interesting to see what the above first-order conditions imply for
an optimal steady state:
Proposition 2. At an optimal steady state, the capital stock is given by
kFB =
ϕ
(
IFB
)
1− θ¯ , (5)
where I ∗ is determined by
δA
1−δθ¯ =
1
ϕ′
(
IFB
) . (6)
Condition (6) has a natural interpretation in terms of marginal costs and
benefits. The marginal revenue of a unit of capital at the end of period 0 is
δA
1−δθ¯ =δA+δ
2θ¯A+ ...+ δt θ¯ t−1A+ ...,
because it produces θ¯ t−1A units of the consumption good at each date t >0 and
the present value of that consumption is δt θ¯ t−1A. The marginal cost of a unit
of capital is 1
ϕ′(IFB) units of consumption at date 0. So the optimality condition
(6) requires the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue.
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3. An Incomplete Markets Economy
In this section we specify the structure of markets available in this economy
and study the decision problems of individual firms and consumers.
3.1 Firms and markets
In the capital goods sector, because production is instantaneous and no capital
is used, firms simply maximize current profits in each period.
In the consumption sector, firms use capital, are infinitely lived, and choose
their investment level and financing strategy each period in the available
markets. Firms are ex ante identical but are subject to idiosyncratic depreciation
shocks each period. Their ex post heterogeneity cannot be ignored when we
study their investment and financing decisions.
In a frictionless environment, in which firms have access to a complete set of
contingent markets to borrow against their future income stream and hedge the
idiosyncratic depreciation shocks, the first-best allocation can be decentralized,
in the usual way, as a perfectly competitive equilibrium. In what follows, we
consider instead an environment with financial frictions, where there are no
markets for contingent claims, firms are financed exclusively with debt and
equity, and their output is sold in spot markets. In this environment, as we will
see, the first-best is typically not attainable.
In the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount and value of a firm’s
capital in the subsequent period, debt financing gives rise to the risk of
bankruptcy. This may be perceived by the firm as costly because, in the event
of default, the firm is required to liquidate its assets by selling them to firms
that remain solvent. These firms, though solvent, may be finance constrained.
When this happens, there will be a fire sale, in which assets are sold for less
than their full economic value.
Equity financing, by contrast, entails no bankruptcy risk. The disadvantage
of equity is that firms must pay a (distortionary) tax on equity’s returns. We
assume for simplicity that the revenue of the tax on equity is used to make an
equal lump sum transfer to all consumers.
Both sources of funding, debt and equity, entail some private costs for firms
in the consumption goods sector. Firms choose their optimal capital structure in
each period, that is, the composition of outstanding debt and equity, by trading
off the relative costs and benefits.
Given the CRTS property of the technology, the size of individual firms and
the mass of firms active in the consumption goods sector are indeterminate.
Moreover, because there will be bankruptcy of some of the existing firms and
we allow for entry of new firms, the mass of active firms may change over time.
To simplify the description of equilibrium, we will focus our attention on the
case in which a combination of entry and exit maintains the mass of firms equal
to unity and firms adjust their size so that each of them has the same amount of
capital. Given the inherent indeterminacy of equilibrium in the consumption
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goods sector, this assumption entails no essential loss of generality and allows
us to describe the evolution of the economy in terms of a representative firm
with capital stock kt .
At the initial date t =0, we assume that all capital is owned by firms in the
consumption goods sector and that each of these firms has been previously
financed entirely by equity. Each consumer has an equal shareholding in each
firm in the two sectors.
In what follows we shall focus our attention on the case in which all firms’
debt has a maturity of one period, so that the entire debt is due for repayment
one period after it is issued. Alternatively, we could have assumed a maturity
of n periods. In that case, the repayment due each period would be smaller.
However, debt with longer maturity also creates a moral hazard problem for
creditors, because creditors have little power over a firm as long as it pays the
required interest and principal in any period. Hence, equity holders could enrich
themselves at the expense of bond holders, paying themselves large dividends
by selling off capital until the firm is worthless. To address this problem
long-term bond contracts typically contain multiple covenants controlling the
behavior of the firm. For instance, covenants might restrict the firm’s ability
to issue new debt, require the firm to maintain an adequate ratio of earnings
to interest payments, the so-called interest coverage ratio, or to maintain the
value of its assets in relation to the value of debt. If any of those covenants is
violated, the firm is technically in default and the repayment of the entire debt
is due immediately, forcing a renegotiation of the debt, similarly to the case
of one-period bonds. In the Online Appendix, we show how the model can be
extended to the special case of perpetual bonds, in which covenants give rise
to default precisely as it occurs with one-period bonds.
To analyze the firms’ decision formally we must first describe in more detail
the structure of markets and the timing of the debt renegotiation process, leading
possibly to default and liquidation.
3.2 Renegotiation and default
Each date t is divided into three subperiods, labeled A, B, and C.
A. In the first subperiod (A), the production of the consumption good occurs
and the depreciation shock of each firm i, θit , is realized. Also, the debt
liabilities of each firm are due. The firm has three options: it can repay
the debt; renegotiate (“roll over”) the debt; or it can default and declare
bankruptcy. Renegotiation is modeled by a game described in the next
section. If renegotiation succeeds, the firm remains solvent and may
then distribute its earnings to equity holders or retain them to finance
new purchases of capital.
B. In the intermediate subperiod (B), the market in which bankrupt firms
can sell their assets (capital goods) opens. A finance constraint applies,
so that only agents with ready cash, either solvent firms who retained
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earnings in subperiod A or consumers who received dividends in
subperiod A, can purchase the assets on sale. Let qt denote the market
price of the liquidated capital.
C. In the final subperiod (C), the production of capital goods occurs. The
profits of the firms who operate in this sector are distributed to the
consumers who own them. In addition, debt holders of defaulting firms
receive the proceeds of the liquidation sales in subperiod B. The taxes
on equity’s returns are due and the lump sum transfers to consumers are
also made in this subperiod. All remaining markets open. Consumption
and capital goods are traded on spot markets, and firms issue debt and
equity to finance the purchase of new capital goods. Consumers buy
and sell these securities to fund future consumption and rebalance their
portfolios. Equilibrium requires that qt ≤vt , where vt is the price of
capital in subperiod C; if qt >vt no firm buys capital at the price qt
and capital goods are in excess supply in subperiod B, contradicting the
equilibrium conditions.
Agents face no finance constraint in the markets in subperiod C. We can
interpret the fact that this constraint only applies to the markets for liquidated
assets in subperiod B as portraying the haste with which the firms’ assets need
to be sold after a default. It can also be taken as an institutional feature of the
bankruptcy process that does not apply to other markets.
Bankruptcy procedures are the source of numerous possible frictions (see
Bebchuk 1988; Aghion, Hart, and Moore 1992; Shleifer and Vishny 1992).
In the present model, we focus on one potential source of market failure, the
so-called finance constraint, which requires buyers to pay for their purchases
of assets with the funds (cash) available to them, not with the issue of IOUs.6
Hence, the potential buyer may not be able to raise enough finance to purchase
the assets at their full economic value.This is the cost of bankruptcy as perceived
by firms in the environment considered and is endogenously determined in
equilibrium.7
We believe that our model of capital markets, with a clear distinction between
liquidation markets, represented by subperiod B in which only cash is accepted,
and normal markets, represented by subperiod C in which firms have complete
access to external finance and there is no finance constraint, is a reasonable
approximation of reality. It is generally accepted that capital markets are not
6 The finance constraint takes the form of a liquidity constraint similar to the familiar cash-in-advance constraint
used in macroeconomic and monetary models. We prefer the term finance constraint, first, because there is no
money in the model and, second, because we interpret the constraint as merely ruling out the possibility of
borrowing to fund the purchase of asset trades due to the urgency of these transactions, rather than requiring
“cash on the barrelhead.”
7 In the dynamic environment considered, at any t both the resale price qt and the full value vt are endogenous.
As further discussed in Section 5.2, we could allow for an additional, deadweight cost of bankruptcy, with no
substantial change in the results.
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perfect and it is costly and time consuming for firms to obtain external finance.
A firm with sufficient time available may find it feasible to raise finance for
new capital goods by issuing debt and/or equity. In contrast, when a distressed
firm sells assets in a fire sale, firms in the same industry do not have the time
to obtain external finance and have to rely on retained earnings to purchase
these assets.8 The distinction between markets for liquidated assets, in which
assets have to sold in a hurry, and normal asset markets is obviously a matter
of degree. Here, we have made the distinction sharper than it is in reality by
assuming the market for liquidated capital goods is “cash only,” whereas firms
in the other market have “free” access to external finance. This makes the
model tractable, without distorting reality too much, but the distinction could
be weakened without substantial qualitative change.
3.2.1 SubperiodA: The renegotiation game. Consider a firm with kt units of
capital and an outstanding debt with face value dtkt 9 at the beginning of period
t . The firm produces Akt units of the consumption good, learns the realization
of its depreciation shock θt and must then choose whether to repay the debt
or try to renegotiate it. The renegotiation process that occurs in subperiod A
between the firm and the creditors who purchased the firm’s bonds at t−1 is
represented by a two-stage game.
S1. The firm makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to the bond holders to rollover
the debt, replacing each unit of the maturing debt with face value dt with
a combination of equity and debt maturing the following period. The
new face value of the debt, dt+1, determines the firm’s capital structure
because equity is just a claim to the residual value.
S2. The creditors simultaneously accept or reject the firm’s offer.
Two conditions must be satisfied for renegotiation to succeed. First, a majority
of the creditors must accept the offer. Second, the rest of the creditors must be
paid off in full. If either condition is not satisfied, the renegotiation fails and
the firm is declared bankrupt. In that event, all the assets of the firm are frozen,
nothing is distributed until the capital stock has been liquidated (sold in the
market). After liquidation, the sale price of the liquidated assets is distributed
to the bond holders in subperiod C. Obviously, there is nothing left for the
shareholders in this case. Hence, default is always involuntary: a firm acting so
as to maximize its market value will always repay or roll over the debt unless
it is unable to do so.
Next, we show that there is an equilibrium of this renegotiation game in
which renegotiation succeeds if and only if
dtkt ≤ (A+qtθt )kt , (7)
8 A model of this process is found in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
9 Here, and in what follows, it is convenient to denote the face value of the debt issued per unit of capital acquired
by dt .
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that is, if the value of the firm’s equity is negative when its capital is evaluated
at its liquidation price qt . Note that the condition is independent of kt .
Consider, with no loss of generality, the case of a firm with one unit of capital,
that is, kt =1, and take an individual creditor holding debt with face value dt .
If he rejects the offer and demands to be repaid immediately, he receives dt in
subperiod A. With this payment, because qt ≤vt , we can assume without loss
of generality that he purchases dt
qt
units of capital in subperiod B. Similarly, if
the firm manages to roll over its debt, it can retain its cashflow A and purchase
A
qt
units of capital in subperiod B. Then it will have A
qt
+θt units of capital at
the start of subperiod C. Therefore, the most that the firm can offer the creditor
is a claim to an amount of capital A
qt
+θt at the beginning of subperiod C, with
market value vt
(
A
qt
+θt
)
. The firm’s offer will be accepted only if the creditor
rejecting the offer obtains no more capital than by accepting. Hence, the firm
is only able to make an offer that is accepted if
dt
qt
≤ A
qt
+θt ,
which is equivalent to (7).
If (7) is satisfied, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
renegotiation game in which the firm makes an acceptable offer worth dt/qt
units of capital at the end of the period to the creditors and all of them accept.
To see this, note first that the shareholders receive a nonnegative payoff from
rolling over the debt, whereas they get nothing in the event of default. Second,
the creditors will accept the offer of dt/qt because they cannot get a higher
payoff by deviating and rejecting it, and they will not accept a lower offer.
Thus, we have the following simple result.
Proposition 3. There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the rene-
gotiation game, in which the debt is renegotiated if and only if (7) is
satisfied.
Proposition 3 leaves open the possibility that renegotiation may fail even
if (7) is satisfied. Indeed, it is the case that if every other creditor rejects the
offer, it is optimal for a creditor to reject the offer because a single vote has no
effect. In the sequel, we ignore this trivial coordination failure among lenders
and assume that renegotiation succeeds whenever (7) is satisfied, to explore
other, less trivial, sources of inefficiency.
3.2.2 Subperiod B: Liquidation. Let zt denote the break even value of θt ,
implicitly defined by the following equation
dt ≡A+qtzt . (8)
Thus, renegotiation fails and a firm is bankrupt if and only if θt <zt . When all
firms active at the beginning of date t have the same size (kt ), the supply of
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capital to be liquidated by bankrupt firms in subperiod B is∫ zt
0
θtktf (θt )dθt .
If qt <vt , a manager operating a solvent firm in the interest of its shareholders
will roll over the entire amount of its debt in subperiod A and retain all
its earnings to have them available to purchase capital at fire sale prices in
subperiod B. This choice maximizes the firm’s market value and shareholders
can always sell their shares to finance consumption. On the other hand, if qt =vt
solvent firms are indifferent between retaining their earnings or distributing
them as dividends. The maximal amount of resources available to purchase
capital in subperiod B is then given by the total revenue of solvent firms (with
θt ≥zt )
A
∫ 1
zt
ktf (θt )dθt =A(1−F (zt ))kt .
Hence, market clearing in the liquidation market requires
qt
∫ zt
0
θtktf (θt )dθt ≤A(1−F (zt ))kt , (9)
with (9) holding with equality if qt <vt , in which case all the available resources
of solvent firms must be offered in exchange for liquidated capital.
3.2.3 Subperiod C: Settlement, investment, and trades. The decision of
the firms operating in the capital goods sector, in subperiod C, is simple. At
any date t , the representative firm chooses It ≥0 to maximize current profits,
vtϕ (It )−It . Because of the concavity of the production function, a necessary
and sufficient condition for the investment level It to be optimal is
vtϕ
′ (It )≤1, (10)
with strict equality if It >0. The profits from the capital sector,
πt =supIt≥0{vtϕ (It )−It }, are then paid to consumers in the same subperiod.
In the consumption goods sector, the firms’ decision is more complicated
because the production of consumption goods requires capital, which generates
returns that repay the investment over time. So the firm needs funds, issuing
debt and equity to finance the purchase of capital.
As we explained above, the number and size of firms in this sector are
indeterminate because of constant returns to scale. We consider a symmetric
equilibrium in which, at any date, a unit mass of firms are active and all of
them have the same size, given by kt units of capital,10 at the end of date t . The
10 Because a fraction of firms default each period, the surviving firms who acquire their capital may grow in size
in sub-period B but are then indifferent between buying or selling capital at vt in sub-period C. Hence, we can
always consider a situation in which the mass of active firms remains unchanged over time, whereas their size
varies with kt .
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representative firm chooses its capital structure to maximize its market value,
that is, the value of the outstanding debt and the equity claims on the firm.
This capital structure is summarized by the breakeven point11 zt+1. Whenever
the firm’s depreciation shock next period is θt+1 <zt+1, the firm defaults and its
value (again per unit of capital held at the end of date t) is equal to the value
of the firm’s liquidated assets, A+qt+1θt+1. If θt+1 >zt+1, the firm is solvent and
can use its earnings A to purchase capital at the price qt+1. Then the pretax
value of the firm is vt+1
(
A
qt+1
+θt+1
)
.
With regard to the corporate tax, the accounting treatment of depreciation in
the presence of fire sales poses some problems in calculating corporate income.
For simplicity, we assume that the tax base is the value of the firm’s equity at
the beginning of subperiod C, whenever it is non negative. The tax rate is then
denoted by τ >0. This tax has the same qualitative properties as the corporate
income tax, in the sense that it is a tax on capital goods and gives preferred
treatment to interest on debt.12
To calculate the value of equity, we need to subtract from the value of capital
owned by the firm, vt+1
(
A
qt+1
+θt+1
)
, and the value of the (renegotiated) debt,
vt+1
(
dt+1
qt+1
)
. The tax base is
vt+1
(
A
qt+1
+θt+1
)
−vt+1
(
dt+1
qt+1
)
(11)
and the tax payment due at date t +1, in subperiod C, is
τ max
{
vt+1
(
A
qt+1
+θt+1
)
−vt+1
(
dt+1
qt+1
)
,0
}
=τ max
{
vt+1
qt+1
(A+qt+1θt+1−dt+1),0
}
.
Because there is no aggregate uncertainty, and there is a continuum of firms
offering debt and equity subject to idiosyncratic shocks, diversified debt and
equity are risk-free and must bear the same rate of return. Denoting by rt the
risk-free interest rate between dates t and t +1, the value of the firm at t is given
by the expected value of the firm at date t +1
∫ zt+1
0
(A+qt+1θt+1)dF +
∫ 1
zt+1
[
vt+1
(
A
qt+1
+θt+1
)
−τ vt+1
qt+1
(A+qt+1θt+1−dt+1)
]
dF,
(12)
11 The level of z determines the face value of the debt as in (8).
12 In the Online Appendix we show formally the equivalence between a proportional tax on corporate earnings and
a proportional tax on the value of equity in a slightly simpler specification of the environment, where depreciation
is nonstochastic.
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divided by 1+rt . Hence, the firm’s problem consists in the choice of its capital
structure, as summarized by zt+1, so as to maximize the following objective
function
1
1+rt
{∫ zt+1
0
(A+qt+1θt+1)dF +
∫ 1
zt+1
[
vt+1
(
A
qt+1
+θt+1
)
−τvt+1(θt+1−zt+1)
]
dF
}
(13)
in which we used (8) to substitute for dt+1 in (12). The solution of the firm’s
problem has a fairly simple characterization:
Proposition 4. When13 vt+1 >qt+1 there is a unique solution zt for the firm’s
optimal capital structure, given by zt+1 =0 when
(
1− qt+1
vt+1
)
Af (0)≥τ and by
0<zt <1 satisfying(
1
qt+1
− 1
vt+1
)
(A+qt+1zt+1) f
(zt+1)
1−F (zt+1) =τ
when
(
1− qt+1
vt+1
)
Af (0)<τ .
The value of the firm (per unit of capital) at a solution of (13) is then equal
to the market value of capital, vt .
The representative consumer has an income flow generated by his initial
ownership of shares of firms in the two sectors, equal to the date 0 value of
firms with capital k0 in the consumption goods sector plus the payment each
period of the profitsπt of firms in the capital good sector. In addition, he receives
lump sum transfers Tt from the government at every date. Because he faces no
income risk and can fully diversify the idiosyncratic income risk of equity and
corporate debt, the consumer effectively trades a riskless asset each period. His
choice problem reduces to the maximization of the discounted stream of utility
subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
max
∑∞
t=0δ
tu(ct )
s.t. c0 +
∑∞
t=1ptct =Ak0 +v0θ¯k0 +π0 +
∑∞
t=1pt (Tt +πt ),
(14)
where pt =
∏t−1
s=0
1
1+rs is the discount rate between date 0 and date t , given the
access to risk free borrowing and lending each period at the rate rt .14
13 When vt+1 =qt+1, the solution is clearly full debt financing, zt+1 =1.
14 The (average) value of firms owning the initial endowment of capital k0 equals the value of the output Ak0
produced with this capital in sub-period A, plus the value of the capital left after depreciation in sub-period C,
θ¯k0v0. Because they are, as we said, financed entirely with equity, this coincides with their equity value. Also,
while producers of capital good operate and hence distribute profits in every period t ≥0, the first equity issue is
at the end of date 0, and hence the first tax revenue on equity earnings is at date t =1.
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The market-clearing condition for the consumption good is
ct +It =Akt , for all t ≥0. (15)
The markets for debt and equity clear, at any t , if the amount of households’
savings is equal to the value of debt and equity issued by firms in that
period. We show in the Appendix that the market-clearing condition for the
securities markets is automatically satisfied if the market-clearing condition
for the consumption goods market (15) is satisfied. This is just an application
of Walras’ law.
Finally, the market for capital clears if
kt+1 = θ¯kt +ϕ (It ). (16)
4. Equilibrium
We are now ready to state the equations defining a competitive equilibrium in
the environment described.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of values{(
c∗t ,k∗t+1,z
∗
t+1,I
∗
t ,q
∗
t ,v
∗
t ,r
∗
t
)}∞
t=0 satisfying the following conditions.
1. Proﬁt maximization in the capital goods sector. For every date t ≥0,
I ∗t solves (10).
2. Optimal capital structure. For every date t ≥0, the capital structure
z∗t+1 of the firms in the consumption goods sector satisfies:(
1
q∗t+1
− 1
v∗t+1
)(
A+q∗t+1z
∗
t+1
) f (z∗t+1)
1−F (z∗t+1) =τ,
and the value of firms in this sector satisfies the law of motion(
1+r∗t
)
v∗t =
{∫ z∗
t+1
0
(
A+q∗t+1θt+1
)
dF +
∫ 1
z∗
t+1
(
v∗t+1
(
A
q∗t+1
+θt+1
)
−τv∗t+1(θt+1−zt+1)
)
dF
}
.
3. Optimal consumption. The sequence
{
c∗t
}∞
t=0 satisfies the following first-
order conditions
δu′
(
c∗t+1
)
u′(c∗t )
=
1
1+r∗t
,
for every date t ≥0, together with the budget constraint
c∗0 +
∞∑
t=1
(
t−1∏
s=0
1
1+r∗s
)
c∗t =Ak0 +v
∗
0 θ¯k0 +v
∗
0ϕ(I ∗0 )−I ∗0 +
∞∑
t=1
(
t−1∏
s=0
1
1+r∗s
)(
τk∗t v
∗
t
∫ 1
z∗t
(
θt −z∗t
)
f (θt )dθt +v∗t ϕ
(
I ∗t
)−I ∗t
)
.
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4. Liquidationmarket clearing. For every date t >0, q∗t ≤v∗t and (9) holds.
5. Consumption goods market clearing. For every date t ≥0, (15) holds.
6. Capital market clearing. For every date t ≥0, the sequence {k∗t }
satisfies (16) and k∗0 = k¯0.
Condition 1 requires firms in the capital goods sector to maximize profits
at every date, taking the price of capital goods v∗t as given. Condition 2
requires firms in the consumption goods sector to choose their capital structures
optimally. The law of motion for the value of the firm is simply the Bellman
equation associated with the maximization problem in Equation (13). Condition
3 requires that the consumption path solves the consumers’ maximization
problem (14). Conditions 4–6 are the market-clearing conditions for the
liquidated capital goods market in subperiod B and for consumption goods
and capital goods market in subperiod C.
The equilibrium market prices of equity ve∗t and debt vb∗t (per unit of capital)
at any date t are readily obtained from the other equilibrium variables.15 Note
that the debt equity ratio, given by16
vb∗t
ve∗t
=
∫ z∗
t+1
0
(
A+q∗t+1θ
)
dF +
∫ 1
z
v∗t+1
(
A
q∗
t+1
+z∗t+1
)
dF∫ 1
z∗
t+1
v∗t+1(θ−z∗t+1)(1−τ )dF
, (17)
is always increasing in z∗t+1. The denominator of (17) is in fact clearly decreasing
in z∗t+1. Because vb∗t +ve∗t =v∗t and z∗t+1 maximizes the firms’ market value v∗t
the numerator must then increase with z∗t+1.
Putting together the market-clearing condition (9) for liquidated capital in
subperiod B with the optimality conditions for the firms in the consumption
goods sector (Proposition 4), we see that in equilibrium we must have an interior
optimum for the firms’ capital structure: zt ∈ (0,1) and qt <vt .17 Thus, default
occurs with probability strictly between zero and one:
0<F (zt )<1,
and results in a fire sale. Intuitively, if there were no fire sale (qt =vt ) firms would
choose 100% debt financing, but this implies default with probability one, which
is inconsistent with market clearing. Similarly, 100% equity financing for all
firms implies that there is no default and no fire sale, so each firm would rather
use 100% debt financing. The only remaining alternative is that firms use a
mixture of debt and equity and face the possibility of fire sales.
15 As explained above, the returns on diversified equity and debt are deterministic. Thus, ve∗t and vb∗t must be such
that the one-period expected returns on debt and equity are equal to the risk free-rate.
16 The term on the denominator, is obtained from the expression of the pretax value of the equity of the firm, when
solvent, obtained in (11). This is then subtracted from the overall value of the firm, in (13), to obtain the value
of debt.
17 Condition 2 above is in fact stated for this case.
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We also see from the previous analysis that uncertainty only affects
the returns and default decisions of individual firms. All other equilibrium
variables, aggregate consumption, investment, and market prices are
deterministic.
4.1 Steady-state equilibria
A steady state is a competitive equilibrium
{(
c∗t ,k∗t ,z∗t ,I ∗t ,q∗t ,v∗t ,r∗t
)}∞
t=0 in
which for all t ≥0(
c∗t ,k
∗
t ,z
∗
t ,I
∗
t ,q
∗
t ,v
∗
t ,r
∗
t
)
=(c∗,k∗,z∗,I ∗,q∗,v∗,r∗).
We show first that a steady state exists and is unique. In addition, the system of
conditions defining a steady state can be reduced to a system of two equations.
Proposition 5. Under the maintained assumptions, there exists a unique
steady-state equilibrium, obtained as a solution of the following system of
equations:
q∗ =
A(1−F (z∗))∫ z∗
0 θf (θ )dθ
, (18)
v∗ =
δA
1−δθ¯ +τδ∫ 1
z∗ (θ−z∗)dF
<
δA
1−δθ¯ , (19)(
1
q∗
− 1
v∗
)
(A+q∗z∗) f (z
∗)
1−F (z∗) =τ. (20)
We can then also identify some of the comparative statics properties of the
steady state.
Proposition 6. (i) An increase in the tax rate τ increases the steady value of
z∗ (and hence the debt-equity ratio) and reduces that of q∗, but the effect on v∗
(and hence I ∗ and k∗) is ambiguous.
(ii) An increase in the discount factor δ decreases the steady-state value of
z∗ (and hence the debt-equity ratio) and increases the one of q∗ as well of v∗,
so that I ∗ and k∗ increase too.
To gain some intuition for these results, consider in particular the case of
an increase in the tax rate τ . This increases the cost of equity financing, so
that firms shift to higher debt financing, thus decreasing the liquidity available
in subperiod B and hence the liquidation value of defaulting firms. Whereas
the direct effect of the higher tax rate, by making equity financing costlier, is
clearly to decrease v, the fact that the higher tax increases debt financing (z)
has an opposite effect on v, increasing it as we see from (19), and, hence, the
overall effect on v is ambiguous.
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4.2 Transition dynamics
The steady state is often studied because of its simplicity, but non-steady-
state paths may have very different properties. For this particular model,
however, the steady state is representative of equilibrium paths in general,
at least if one is willing to assume that consumers are risk neutral.18 In that
case, we can show that, in any equilibrium, there is a constant equilibrium
capital structure that coincides with the steady state capital structure; the
same is then true for q, v, and I . Thus, outside the steady state, the only
variable that is changing is the capital stock, which converges monotonically
to the steady-state value. In this sense, little is lost by focusing on the steady
state. The analysis of transition dynamics is included for completeness to the
Online Appendix.
5. Welfare Analysis
5.1 The inefficiency of equilibrium
If we compare the conditions for a Pareto-efficient steady state derived in
Proposition 2 with the conditions for a steady-state equilibrium derived in
Section 4.1, we find that steady-state equilibria are Pareto efficient if I ∗ =IFB ,
which happens when the equilibrium market value of capital is given by
v∗ =
δ
1−δθ¯ A.
From the equilibrium conditions, in particular Condition 2, it can be seen
immediately that the equality above can hold only if τ =0. In that case, there
is no cost of issuing equity and the firms in the consumption goods sector will
choose 100% equity financing. On the other hand, when τ >0, as we have
been assuming, the equilibrium market value of capital v∗ is strictly lower
than δ1−δθ¯ A and I
∗ and k∗ are strictly less than the corresponding values at the
first best steady state. Thus, in a steady-state equilibrium, the financial frictions
given by market incompleteness and the costs of default and equity financing as
perceived by firms imply that firms invest a lower amount and the equilibrium
stock of capital is lower than at the efficient steady state. Hence, even with a
representative consumer, competitive equilibria are Pareto inefficient.19
Short of getting rid of the corporate income tax, a policy of changing the tax
rate so as to reduce the tax revenue would also improve welfare. As we saw in
18 Because there is no aggregate uncertainty, risk aversion is not an issue. The only role played by the curvature of
the utility function is to determine the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS). By assuming that the
utility function is linear, one imposes a constant IMRS. This restricts somewhat the adjustment of endogenous
variables along the transition path but is otherwise innocuous.
19 When the initial capital stock k0 =kFB the unique Pareto-efficient allocation of the economy is the Pareto-efficient
steady state. Because the equilibrium allocation is different, it is clearly Pareto inefficient. For other values of k0,
the transitional dynamics of the Pareto-efficient allocation needs also to be considered to claim the inefficiency
of the equilibrium. This can be shown formally by proceeding along similar lines to the ones of the next section.
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the comparative statics exercise,20 such a change in the tax rate will increase
the value of the firm (capital goods), causing an increase in investment and
consumption. Similarly, policies such as accelerated depreciation, expensing
of investments in research and development, or subsidies on investment will
also increase welfare.
In our simplified model, all firms are ex ante identical. If firms are
heterogeneous, however, it might be advantageous to target firms that are
vulnerable to fire sales, either because they are riskier or because they have
less liquid markets for liquidated capital goods. In that case, a uniform tax rate
on corporate income, combined with incentives for particular industries, might
be required.
5.2 Constrained inefficiency
It is not surprising that the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient in the presence of
financial frictions affecting firms’ financing. To assess the scope of policy and
regulatory interventions, however, it is more interesting and appropriate to see
whether a welfare improvement can be found, taking as given the presence of
such frictions (market incompleteness, finance constraints, and distortionary
taxation). More precisely, we examine whether regulating the levels of a single
endogenous variable, in particular, the capital structure as represented by z, can
lead to a welfare improvement, while allowing all other variables to reach their
equilibrium levels. If so, we say that competitive equilibria are constrained
inefficient.
Suppose the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium and consider an
intervention consisting in a permanent21 change z starting at some fixed
but arbitrary date t +1. Thus, from this date onward, z is constant and equal
to z∗ +z. To determine the welfare effects of this intervention, we need to
trace the changes in equilibrium prices, investment, and consumption over time
and hence the transition to the new steady state. To make this analysis more
transparent, we assume as in Section 4.2 that consumers are risk neutral,22 that
is, u(c)=c.
The induced changes in the equilibrium variables q and v are then obtained by
substituting the new value of z into the market-clearing condition in subperiod
B, (9),
A(1−F (z∗ +z))=qt+1+i
∫ z∗+z
0
θdF, (21)
20 See in particular the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix.
21 We focus attention on a permanent intervention, but it is fairly easy to verify that the same welfare result holds
in the case of a temporary intervention.
22 See footnote 18 for a discussion of this specification of consumers’ preferences.
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and the law of motion of v, appearing in condition 2 of the definition of a
competitive equilibrium,23
vt+i =δ
{
A+vt+1+i θ¯−τvt+1+i
∫ 1
z∗+z
(θ−z∗−z)dF
}
, (22)
for all i≥0.24 We see from (21) that the new equilibrium value for qt+i is the
same for all i and from (22) we obtain a first-order difference equation in v.
The solution of this equation diverges monotonically because the coefficient
on vt+1+i has absolute value∣∣∣∣θ¯−τ
∫ 1
z∗+z
(θ−z∗−z)dF
∣∣∣∣<max
{
θ¯ ,τ
∫ 1
z∗+z
(θ−z∗−z)dF
}
≤max{θ¯ ,τ θ¯}= θ¯ <1.
Hence, the only admissible solution is obtained by setting vt+i equal to its new
steady-state value:
vt+i =vt+1+i =v
∗ +v=
δA
1−δθ¯ +δτ ∫ 1
z∗+z(θ−z∗−z)dF
. (23)
The new equilibrium investment level is then determined by the optimality
condition for the capital goods producers, (10),
vt+iϕ
′ (It+i)=1. (24)
Because, by the previous argument, vt+i is equal to its new steady-state
equilibrium value, v∗ +v, we have It+i =I ∗ +I for all i≥0, where the sign
of I equals the sign of v. By substituting this value into the capital market
clearing condition, (16) we obtain that the law of motion of the capital stock is
now
kt+i+1 = θ¯kt+i +ϕ (I ∗ +I )
for all i≥0, with kt =k∗.
The dynamics of agents’ consumption is given by the following equations:
ct+i =Akt+i −(I ∗ +I ), for all i≥0.
By substituting the values of k obtained from the law of motion of capital, we
find that the change in consumption for a (marginal) change in z (and hence in
23 We used here (9) and the property 1+rt+i =1/δ, following from the specification of consumers’ preferences, to
simplify the expression.
24 Note that expressions (21) and (22) give us the new equilibrium levels of q and v also for any discrete change
z, as long as we have v≥q, that is, as long as z+z is not too close to zero.
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v and I ) is given by
ct =−I,
ct+i =
{
−1+A1− θ¯
i
1− θ¯ ϕ
′ (I ∗)
}
I, ∀i≥1.
and hence the effect on agents’ welfare is
∞∑
i=0
δict+i =
{
1
1−δ
(
−1+A δ
1− θ¯ ϕ
′ (I ∗)
)
−
∞∑
i=1
(
δθ¯
)i
A
1
1− θ¯ ϕ
′ (I ∗)
}
I
=
{
− 1
1−δ +
(
A
1
1− θ¯ ϕ
′ (I ∗)
)(
δ
1−δ −
δθ¯
1−δθ¯
)}
I.
The term in brackets in this expression is strictly positive because, as we showed
in the previous section, in a steady-state equilibrium we always have
A
δ
1−δθ¯ >
1
ϕ′(I ∗) =v
∗.
Hence, consumers’ welfare increases if and only if I >0.
From (23) it is then easy to verify that sign v= sign z, because
d
dz∗
∫ 1
z∗
(θ−z∗)dF =−
∫ 1
z∗
dF <0.
From (24) we obtain then
dI
dz
=
dv
dz
dI
dv
=
dv
dz
(
− ϕ
′
vϕ′′
)
>0.
This establishes the following.
Proposition 7. The steady-state competitive equilibrium is constrained
inefficient: a permanent increase in z above its equilibrium value is welfare
improving.
The intervention is specified in terms of the threshold z below which the
firm has to default on its debt. As argued in Section 4, a marginal increase of
z∗ corresponds to an increase in the firms’ debt-equity ratio.
Proposition 7 establishes the optimality of a marginal increase in z. Consider
then a sequence of discrete changes z, such that z+z approaches 1. Along
such a sequence, q goes to zero,25 and we also see from (23) that v approaches
25 Note that the equilibrium condition (21) has an admissible solution for all z+z<1, but not in the limit for
z+z=1.
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δA
1−δθ¯ , and hence, by (6), I approaches IFB . That is, in the limit, the equilibrium
corresponding to such an intervention converges to the steady-state, first-best
allocation.26 We can then say that the constrained optimal capital structure of
firms exhibits maximal leverage.
To gain some understanding of the determinants of the above result, note
first that, when firms increase their leverage, that is, z is increased above z∗, the
tax paid on each unit of capital, τ
∫ 1
z
(θ−z)dF , decreases. At the same time, as
we can see from the expression of the firms’ market value in (13), firms face a
higher probability of default and hence a higher expected capital loss in default,
given by the difference between the liquidated value of the firm’s assets, q, and
the normal market value, v. At a competitive equilibrium, firms do not want
to deviate from z∗ as the private costs and benefits of a marginal increase in
leverage offset each other. The private cost of default depends, however, on
prices and, when all firms change their leverage choices, prices change. Once
we substitute for q its equilibrium value from the market-clearing condition
(9), as we did in (23), we find that the higher losses incurred by a firm when
bankrupt are perfectly offset by the higher gains made when solvent (when the
firm is able to buy capital at cheaper prices). As a consequence, when we take
the change in prices into account, the net effect of an increase in z by all firms
is just the decrease in the cost of the tax paid, and the firms’ value v increases.
Thus, once the pecuniary externality is internalized, the cost of debt financing
is lower than the cost perceived by firms. Hence, a higher leverage induces a
higher level of v. This in turn increases the firms’ investment, which raises the
capital stock in the economy. Because the equilibrium accumulation of capital
is inefficiently low, as we noticed in Section 5.1, because of costs of equity
and debt financing perceived by firms, the increase in investment and capital
generates a welfare improvement.
The cost of bankruptcy as perceived by firms is a pure transfer, as the fire
sale losses of bankrupt firms provide capital gains for the solvent firms. The
same is true for the corporate income tax, in that case a transfer from solvent
firms to consumers. Because the tax revenue is paid directly to households, one
might think this has something to do with the fact that the tax reduces v. In
fact, it crucially depends on how the tax revenues are paid out. Suppose the
revenues from the tax were paid to firms instead of households. The distortion
will remain as long as the transfers are lump sum, that is, not proportional to
the firm’s capital stock. A rational manager will perceive that an increase in the
firm’s capital stock increases its tax liability, but does not increase the transfer
received, so he will still have an incentive to underinvest in equilibrium. Only
if the transfer were proportional to the value of equity, that is, the tax base,
would the distortionary effect disappear.
26 In contrast, we see from (12), that when firms act as price takers their optimal decision when q→0 is z∼0.
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It is important to note that our result on the welfare benefits of increasing
firms’ leverage does not depend on the absence of deadweight costs of
bankruptcy. Suppose we were to assume that bankrupt firms lose a fraction
0<φ<1 of their output, consumed by the costs of the bankruptcy process.
Each firm would take into account this additional cost of bankruptcy when
choosing its optimal capital structure. The actual costs of bankruptcy for the
firm (the costs once the pecuniary externality is internalized) in this case are
positive, but it is still true that they are lower than the costs perceived by the
firm, because the latter overestimate the costs of fire sales, due to the pecuniary
externality.As a consequence, it remains true that increasing z∗ will increase the
value of capital v∗ and as a result the level of investment and the capital stock
will increase too. Because the equilibrium again exhibits underinvestment, such
an increase in the investment level always increases welfare, as in the situation
considered in this section.
But now an increase in z∗ has another effect on welfare, going in the opposite
direction, as it will also increase the deadweight costs of bankruptcy and hence
reduce the resources that a given stock of capital generates for consumption.
Which of the two effects dominates depends on the elasticity of investment with
respect to v∗ and hence z∗. In the Online Appendix, we replicate the analysis
for the economy with deadweight costs of bankruptcy and show that, if the
elasticity of investment with respect to v∗ is sufficiently high, an increase in
z∗ is welfare improving because the increase in investment is sufficiently large
relative to the increase in deadweight costs. Thus, the distortion caused by fire
sales remains the crucial determinant of the welfare effects of an increase in
firms’ leverage.
6. Conclusion
We have analyzed the firms’ capital structure choice in a dynamic general
equilibrium economy with incomplete markets. Firms face a standard trade-
off between the exemption of interest payments on debt from the corporate
income tax and the risk of bankruptcy and fire sales. Fire sales are endogenously
determined in equilibrium and arise from the illiquidity of the capital market in
which the firm’s assets are sold. When the corporate income tax rate is positive,
we show that fire sales are an essential part of the equilibrium, the optimal
capital structure is uniquely determined in equilibrium and firms’ investment
is lower than at its first-best level. Moreover, the debt to equity ratio chosen by
firms is inefficiently low: a regulatory intervention inducing firms to increase
their leverage generates an increase of firms’ return to capital and hence also
of their investment level and of consumers’ welfare.
These findings highlight the importance of recognizing the presence of a
pecuniary externality when firms evaluate the private cost of default due to fire
sales. The sale of the assets of bankrupt firms at fire-sale prices clearly entails a
loss for such firms, but constitutes, at the same time, a gain for solvent firms who
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are so able to purchase capital cheaply. Our analysis shows that, by ignoring
the effect of a higher leverage ratio on the fire-sale price of firms’ assets, firms
underestimate the benefits of these purchases and perceive the cost of debt
as higher than reality. It is through such pecuniary externalities, concerning
the price of liquidated assets, that interventions modifying the firms’ capital
structure affect welfare in general equilibrium when markets are incomplete.
We also demonstrate the robustness of our findings to the addition of
deadweight costs of default given by the destruction of the firms’ assets. As
long as firms perceive the negative effect of these deadweight costs on their
market value, they will still overestimate the costs of debt financing. Then an
intervention increasing firms’ leverage still increases investment. We can also
think of environments in which there are deadweight costs of bankruptcy that
firms do not take into account. These might include costs imposed on other firms
because of the disruption of the financial system.27 The presence of deadweight
external costs of bankruptcy will tend to reduce the constrained-efficient level
of leverage relative to the equilibrium level. Whether the constrained-efficient
level of leverage is higher or lower than the equilibrium level will depend on
the strength of the two externalities, the one that represents a social cost and
one that does not.
Although the model we have studied deals with corporate debt, the results
are suggestive for the current debate about the funding and capital structure of
financial institutions in the wake of the financial crisis. A similar exercise for
financial institutions would seem to be an important topic for future research.
In the rest of this section, we briefly discuss the sensitivity of our results to
some of the features of the model.
A special feature of our model is the fact that the shocks affecting firms
are purely idiosyncratic and there is no aggregate risk. There has been a lot of
interest in the macroeconomic literature regarding the role of financial frictions
in the propagation of economic shocks. A large and influential stream of this
literature concerns the financial accelerator. In this literature, mentioned in the
Introduction, firms’financing plays an important role. Because of moral hazard
problems, firms’ ability to borrow is limited by the value of equity or of the
assets that serve as collateral. A negative shock to the value of equity and
collateral reduces the firms’ ability to borrow for investment and this in turn
propagates through the cycle. In recent papers (Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010), the
focus has been shifted to the role of banks and the way in which fluctuations
in bank capital restrict lending and propagate business-cycle disturbances.
Our focus, unlike this macroeconomic literature, is on questions of efficiency
and regulation, rather than business-cycle dynamics. Extending the analysis to
include aggregate uncertainty would make the model less tractable, but we
27 Also, in Lorenzoni (2008) and some of the other papers mentioned in the Introduction the capital of bankrupt
firms can only be sold to different types of firms who operate a less productive technology, hence there is a
deadweight cost attached to fire sales.
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believe it would not change the fundamental qualitative features of the results
we obtained. Suppose, for example, that we introduce an additional, aggregate
shock affecting the depreciation of firms’ capital: each unit of capital used by
firm i at date t is reduced, after production of the consumption good, to st θit
units, where st is a common shock and st and θit are independent.28 The law of
motion of capital becomes
kt+1 = st θ¯kt +ϕ (It ),
and hence the accumulation of capital is now stochastic.
In this simple environment, under the maintained risk neutrality assumption,
both the equilibrium value of liquidated capital q and the market value of
capital v decrease with the magnitude of the shock s whereas the firms’ capital
structure, as described by z, is not affected by s. Also, the pecuniary externality
is still present, leading firms to overestimate the cost of bankruptcy and debt
financing and choose too little debt in the equilibrium capital structure. The
introduction of risk aversion may generate additional affects. For example,
an increase in the use of debt financing might increase the volatility of prices,
which could have a negative effect on the welfare of risk averse individuals. On
the other hand, because firms take into account the effect of risk on consumers’
valuation of their plans, at the margin it is not clear that this effect will dominate
the pecuniary externality. An answer to this question would require a proper
quantitative analysis and is a matter for further research.
More generally, the extension of the model to allow for aggregate risk could
offer some interesting implications for the properties of the equilibrium prices
of debt and equity, as well as for the pattern of consumption and investment over
the business cycle. The effects of aggregate uncertainty on the firms’ choice of
capital structure are also of interest. We plan to pursue these issues in future
work.
In our stylized model, there is only one technology for producing
consumption goods. The only choice for the firms in the consumption goods
sector is how to finance their purchases of capital goods. In particular, they have
no control over the riskiness of the production technology. This may be seen as
a limitation, because in practice firms may be able to diversify their business
lines to reduce the risk of default. To test the robustness of our results, it is then
useful to consider an extension of the analysis in which an alternative, safe
technology can be used to produce consumption goods using capital goods.
The safe technology is subject to a nonstochastic depreciation rate 1− θ¯ , but
has a lower productivity B<A.
We can interpret the safe technology as a way to provide liquidity in the
economy. It allows firms to make capital gains from the purchase of assets
in fire sales whenever liquidity is scarce in the system. It can be shown29
28 See the Online Appendix for a formal analysis of this case and the derivation of some properties of equilibria.
29 The details are in the Online Appendix.
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that in equilibrium firms will specialize in one of the technologies. There
proves to be, in fact, no advantage to combining the safe and risky technology.
More interestingly, we find that introducing the safe technology does little to
mitigate the inefficiency: on the contrary, it generates an additional source of
inefficiency and, as long as B is not too high, it reduces welfare. Although
the presence of firms using the safe technology reduces the scale of the fire
sales and raises the price of liquidated assets, it reduces the returns to capital
and hence the incentives to invest. The mechanism generating the inefficiency
is now somewhat different: the introduction of a safe technology diverts the
capital gains from purchases at fire-sale prices to the firms choosing the safe,
but less productive, technology, thus depriving the firms choosing the risky
technology of some of those gains.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From the strict concavity of ϕ and the gradient inequality, it follows
that, for any k<kˆ,
ϕ (Ak)≤ϕ
(
Akˆ
)
+ϕ′
(
Akˆ
)
A
(
k− kˆ
)
=
(
1− θ¯)kˆ+ϕ′(Akˆ)A(k− kˆ)
<
(
1− θ¯)kˆ.
Hence,
ϕ (Ak)+ θ¯k<(1− θ¯)kˆ+ θ¯k<kˆ.
For any k>kˆ,
ϕ (Ak)≤ϕ
(
Akˆ
)
+ϕ′
(
Akˆ
)
A
(
k− kˆ
)
<
(
1− θ¯)kˆ+(1− θ¯)(k− kˆ)
=
(
1− θ¯)k,
where the second inequality follows from the assumptions made on ϕ (·), implying the existence
of a unique solution for kˆ. Thus,
kt >kˆ⇒kt+1 <kt
and
kt <kˆ⇒kt+1 <kˆ.
Proof of Proposition 2. At an optimal steady state the multipliers
{(
λ∗t ,μ∗t
)}∞
t=0 satisfy
λ∗t =δtu′
(
c∗
)
=δt λ∗0,
and hence
μ∗t =
λ∗t
ϕ′ (I ∗) =
δt λ∗0
λ∗0/μ∗0
=δtμ∗0,
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for every t . The first-order conditions for the steady-state optimum can then be written as
u′
(
c∗
)
=λ∗0, (A1)
δλ∗0A+δμ∗0 θ¯ =μ∗0, (A2)
μ∗0ϕ′
(
I ∗
)
=λ∗0. (A3)
Conditions (A2) and (A3) can be rewritten as
δA
1−δθ¯ =
μ∗0
λ∗0
=
1
ϕ′ (I ∗) . (A4)
The feasibility conditions become
c∗ +I ∗ =Ak∗
and
k∗ = θ¯k∗ +ϕ
(
I ∗
)
.
Thus,
k∗ =
ϕ (I ∗)
1− θ¯ ,
where I ∗ is determined by (A4).
Proof of Proposition 4. The derivative of the expression in (13) with respect to zt+1 is easily
calculated to be
1
1+rt
{
(A+qt+1zt+1)f (zt+1)−vt+1
(
A
qt+1
+zt+1
)
f (zt+1) +
τvt+1 (zt+1 −zt+1)f (zt+1)+τvt+1 (1−F (zt+1))}
=
1
1+rt
{(
1− vt+1
qt+1
)
Af (zt+1)+
(
1− vt+1
qt+1
)
qt+1zt+1f (zt+1)+τvt+1 (1−F (zt+1))
}
.
The first-order condition for an interior solution of the firm’s problem requires this expression to
equal zero, a condition that can be written as
(
vt+1
qt+1
−1
)
(A+qt+1zt+1)f (zt+1)=τvt+1 (1−F (zt+1)),
or (
1
qt+1
− 1
vt+1
)
(A+qt+1zt+1) f
(zt+1)
1−F (zt+1) =τ.
A solution to this equation, if it exists, is unique because all terms on the left-hand side are positive
and increasing in zt+1. The term A+qt+1zt+1 is in fact clearly increasing in zt+1, and so is
f (zt+1)
1−F (zt+1)
under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate.
From the above expression, we then see that when
(
1
qt+1
− 1
vt+1
)
Af (0)≥τ , we have a corner
solution with zt+1 =0. In contrast, when
(
1
qt+1
− 1
vt+1
)
Af (0)<τ and qt+1 <vt+1, it is easy to verify
that a corner solution with zt+1 =1 never exists. By the continuity of the objective function in zt+1,
a solution always exists, so it follows that an interior solution exists.
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A.1 Market Clearing in the Securities Market. The value of debt and equity issued by each
firm at any t is equal to the market value of depreciated capital, vt θ¯kt , plus the value of newly
produced capital goods, vtϕ (It ). To find the consumer’s savings, we need to first find the value of
the consumer’s wealth in subperiod C of date t . This is equal to the sum of the profits from the
capital good sector, the proceeds from the liquidation of firms that defaulted in this period, and the
value of the firms that did not default in the period minus the corporation tax plus the lump sum
transfer from the government. The corporation tax and the transfer cancel in equilibrium, and the
consumer’s wealth, wt , is given by
wt =vtϕ (It )−It +
∫ zt
0
(A+qt θt )kt dF +
∫ 1
zt
vt
(
A
qt
+θt
)
kt dF.
Using the market-clearing condition in the liquidation market (9), this simplifies to:
wt =vtϕ (It )−It +Akt +vt θ¯kt .
Therefore, the securities market clears at date t if
wt −ct =vtϕ (It )−It +Akt +vt θ¯kt −ct
=vt
(
θ¯kt +ϕ (It )
)
or
ct +It =Akt .
So market clearing in the consumption goods market (15) implies market clearing in the securities
markets, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5. Equations (18) and (20) come directly from conditions 4 and 2 of the
definition of competitive equilibrium, applied to a steady state. From the equation specifying the
law of motion of the value of the firm, using the fact that at a steady state 1/(1+r∗)=δ, we then get
v∗ =δ
{∫ z∗
0
(A+q∗θ )dF +
∫ 1
z∗
(
v∗
q∗
(A+q∗θ )−τv∗(θ−z∗)
)
dF
}
=δ
{∫ z∗
0
(
A+v∗θ−
(
v∗
q∗
−1
)
q∗θ
)
dF +
∫ 1
z∗
(
A+v∗θ +
(
v∗
q∗
−1
)
A−τv∗(θ−z∗)
)
dF
}
=δ
{
A+v∗θ¯−
∫ 1
z
τv∗(θ−z∗)dF
}
,
where in the last step we used (18) to simplify the expression. Solving for v, we get:
v∗ =
δA
1−δθ¯ +τδ∫ 1
z∗ (θ−z∗)dF
,
that is, Equation (19).
Let v(z∗) denote the solution of Equation (19) with respect to v and let q (z∗) denote the solution
of (18) with respect to q. Note that v(z∗) is a strictly increasing, and q (z∗) is a strictly decreasing
function of z∗. The remaining condition (20) can then be written as(
1− q (z
∗)
v(z∗)
)(
A
q (z∗) +z
∗
)
f (z∗)
1−F (z∗) =τ, (A5)
and it is clear from inspection that all the terms on the left-hand side are increasing in z∗, so there
exists at most one solution, that is one steady state.
To see that there exists a solution to (A5), note that as z∗ →0, q (z∗)→∞, and v(z∗)→ δA1−δθ¯+τδθ¯ ,
so for some finite value z∗ >0, we have q (z∗)=v(z∗) and the left-hand side of (A5) equals zero.
Next, consider what happens as z∗ →1 and note that q (z∗)→0 and v(z∗)→ δA1−δθ¯ >0, so the
left-hand side of (A5) is positive and arbitrarily large. Thus, by continuity, there exists a value of
0<z∗ <1 satisfying (A5).
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Proof of Proposition 6. Consider first the effects of a change in τ or δ. From Equation (18), it
is clear that the solution q (z∗) is independent of τ and δ, whereas the solution of Equation (19)
v(z∗,τ,δ) is decreasing in τ and increasing in δ. Substituting into (A5)(
1− q (z
∗)
v(z∗,τ,δ)
)(
A
q (z∗) +z
∗
)
f (z∗)
1−F (z∗) =τ, (A6)
we see that an increase in τ increases the right-hand side, and by decreasing v(z∗,τ,δ), it decreases
the left-hand side. Thus, for the above condition to be satisfied, the left-hand side must be increased
and that requires an increase in z∗. Thus, an increase in τ increases z∗ and, hence, reduces q∗ =q (z∗).
Because v(z∗,τ,δ) is increasing in z∗ and decreasing in τ , the net effect on v∗ (and hence the effect
on I ∗ and k∗) is uncertain. From Equation (19), we can say that v∗ (and hence I ∗ and k∗) will
increase if the tax revenue τ
∫ 1
z∗ (θ−z∗)dF declines as a result of the increase in τ .
Now consider the impact of an increase in δ. An increase in δ will increase v(z∗,τ,δ) and hence
increase the term on the left-hand side of (A6). For Equation (A6) to hold, z∗ must decrease to
ensure the left-hand side stays constant. This implies that q∗ increases. The overall effect on v
of the decrease in z∗ and increase of δ, because the term on the left-hand side of (A6) must stay
constant for (20) to hold, is that v increases (actually more than q). Hence, I ∗ and k∗ also increase.
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